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Studies of mortgage termination decisions typically rely on a
competing risks framework comparing defaults and prepayments.
While useful tools have been developed to approximate the
values of these competing default and prepayment options, the
available metrics do not adequately account for the role of the
conditional volatility of interest rates and housing prices in
option valuation. Using a sample of 1,428 mortgage loan
payment histories, this study ﬁnds that exponential GARCH
estimates of the conditional volatility of housing prices and
interest rates inﬂuence mortgage termination decisions in a
predictable manner. Speciﬁcally, increased housing price
volatility is shown to enhance default option values, while
increased interest rate volatility is shown to enhance prepayment
option values. Therefore, it would appear that conditional
volatility represents a more reﬁned input into the competing risks
option framework.
Introduction
The competing options framework offers powerful insights into mortgage default
and prepayment decisions. In this framework, the borrower must ultimately choose
between continuing to make timely payments of principal and interest, prepaying
the loan in full, or defaulting on the obligation. If the market value of a property
drops below the outstanding balance of the loan, the borrower may rationally
choose to ruthlessly exercise the default (i.e., put) option.1 This action would
preclude the potentially proﬁtable future exercise of the prepayment option.
Conversely, if the value of the property rises, the borrower captures the entire gain
in the underlying value of the asset.2 With respect to prepayments, if market wide
interest rates fall, the borrower may choose to exercise the prepayment (i.e., call)
option and reﬁnance at a lower rate. Again, such action precludes a future default90  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
option exercise on the (now) prepaid obligation. On the other hand, if rates rise,
the borrower retains the loan at its (now) below-market interest rate.
The competing risks conceptualization of mortgage contracts has resulted in the
increasingly accurate pricing of mortgages and management of risks associated
with these securities. Both default and prepayment represent termination
alternatives that are potentially valuable to borrowers and costly to lenders. Thus,
a borrower’s true equity position within a property is most accurately viewed as
the equity position in the underlying real estate plus two competing options
(Hilliard, Kau and Slawson, 1998).
Since Foster and Van Order’s (1984) path breaking application of option theory
to the mortgage terminations literature, Deng, Quigley and Van Order (1996) and
Ambrose and Capone (1998, 2000) have introduced a pair of measures designed
to capture the extent to which the default and prepayment options are in the
money. These measures, originally labeled PNEQ and PREPAY, are regarded as
state-of-the-art with respect to capturing the relative degree of default and
prepayment option moneyness, respectively.3 Despite their usefulness, these
measures do not fully account for the role and importance of conditional volatility
as indicated by the empirical options literature.4 Speciﬁcally, the PNEQ measure
of default option moneyness incorporates a time-varying volatility metric by using
the standard error of the housing price index. However, this volatility input is
limited insofar as it does not address the fact that housing price volatility changes
more rapidly when there are decreases in market values than when there are
increases. The PREPAY measure of prepayment option moneyness does not
incorporate any volatility metric.
The main contribution of this study is to develop and test more reﬁned volatility
inputs into the default and prepayment competing risks framework. Speciﬁcally,
exponential Garch techniques are employed to model the conditional volatility of
housing prices and interest rates. These volatility estimates are then used as inputs,
along with other control variables, to model default and prepayment termination
decisions. These conditional volatility estimates exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship to mortgage termination decisions.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. The next section considers
different approaches to obtaining estimates of conditional volatility for both
housing prices and interest rates, presents the rationale for the choice of a
particular speciﬁcation and formally articulates the hypotheses. Following this, the
data available for analysis and descriptive statistics are presented. Next, the
hypotheses are tested by estimating Cox regression models for the timing of
defaults and prepayments, and performing a logistic regression to formally model
the competing risks aspect of default and prepayment terminations. The ﬁndings
from the logistic regression are also utilized to conduct a simulation in which the
marginal effects and economic signiﬁcance of the ﬁndings are estimated. The ﬁnal
section offers a summary of the current investigation, and suggests future research
possibilities.Mortgage Terminations  91
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 The Role of Conditional Volatility
To date, the measurement and analysis of the relative moneyness of the embedded
default and prepayment options within mortgage contracts have followed either a
Black-Scholes or binomial model. In both of these models, the role for volatility
of the underlyings in the competing options framework is typically captured by
the unconditional variance (i.e., a constant).5 To the extent that there is an
evaluation of the role for changing volatility, it usually involves measuring the
Vega of the option.6
Recent research on the distribution characteristics of the returns on securities has
revealed that conditional volatility is a critical feature of both equity and debt
securities.7 Applying this research to mortgages, there is ample reason to expect
the exercise of the embedded (default and prepayment) options to be inﬂuenced
signiﬁcantly, ceteris paribus, by the conditional volatility of the two underlyings:
interest rates and housing prices. If this is indeed the case, then using a constant
variance assumption may well lead to incorrect pricing of the embedded options.
This could lead to biases characterized by volatility smiles.
In order to clarify the role of conditional volatility, consider housing prices—one
of the underlyings used in the analysis.8 Begin with an autoregressive AR(1)
process describing changes in housing values. In this description, yt is the change
in housing values relative to the last period ‘‘t  1,’’9 a0 and a1 are constants, and
t1 represents innovations or shocks:
y  a  ay   . (1) t 01 t1 t1
Now, let be the estimated residuals from this form of model. In this setting, {ˆ  } t1
the conditional variance of housing values would be described as:
22 Var{y  y}  E {[y  a ay ]} E [ ]. (2) t1 tt t 01 t1 tt 1
One approach to modeling the volatility of housing values sets equal to 2 E[ ] tt 1
2, in keeping with the assumption of constant variance. However, when the
variance is not constant, the conditional volatility of housing values may be
modeled as an autoregressive process of order q, AR(q), where the residuals are
squared:
22 2 2 ˆ      ˆ    ˆ   ...   ˆ   v. (3) t 01 t12 t2 qt qt92  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
Equation (3) is the ARCH speciﬁcation using squared residuals to describe
conditional volatility, where vt is a white noise process, and the i’s are constants.
A variant of this speciﬁcation, where the disturbances enter multiplicatively, is the
ARCH model proposed by Engle (1982). The conditional variance in such a
situation is:
22 2 2 E(ˆ  )     ˆ    ˆ   ...   ˆ  . (4) tt 10 1 t 2 t1 qt 1q
For an ARCH characterization of the volatility of housing prices, the residuals
can be generated using a variety of techniques. These include standard OLS
regression and autoregressive processes.
A more encompassing description of conditional volatility is the GARCH
speciﬁcation of Bollerslev (1986). In its general form, a GARCH model speciﬁes
conditional variance as a function of a constant, the preceding period’s error and
a long-term variance. In its simplest form, one can specify a GARCH(1,1) model
as:
22 2        , (5) t101 t 1 t
where 1  0. Despite the advantages and the ﬂexibility of the GARCH(p,q)
speciﬁcation, it does not capture an extremely important characteristic of security
returns—the leverage effect. In the present context, the leverage effect speaks to
the fact that the volatility of housing prices changes more rapidly when there are
decreases in the market value of the underlying index than when there are
increases. Explicitly addressing this issue, Nelson (1991) offers an exponential
version of the GARCH model, referred to as EGARCH. In this model, the leverage
effect is depicted as a non-symmetric response to shocks. The simple form of the
EGARCH speciﬁcation, EGARCH(1,1) is:
22 log( )     ƒ( / )   log( ), (6) t10 1 t1 t11 t1
where,
ƒ( / )   ( / )  [( / )  E( / )], (7) t1 t11 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1
where 1 is a constant. In the formulation for EGARCH(p,q), the function f(.) is
the news impact curve relating conditional volatility, to news or
2 log( ), t
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Due to its ability to pick up the leverage effect, the EGARCH(1,1) speciﬁcation
is theoretically superior to the GARCH(1,1) speciﬁcation. Further, the
EGARCH(1,1) does not require any restrictions on the values of the coefﬁcients.10
Therefore, in the empirical work that follows, EGARCH(1,1) estimates of the
conditional volatility of both housing prices and interest rates are employed. Ex
ante, higher levels of housing price volatility are expected to enhance default
option value. In turn, the enhanced default option value reduces borrower
incentives to terminate the mortgage via exercise of the competing prepayment
option. Thus, increased housing price volatility is expected to increase the relative
probability of default. Similarly, higher levels of interest rate volatility are
expected to enhance the relative probability of prepayment option exercise.
 Data
In order to evaluate the empirical signiﬁcance of the conditional volatility of
housing prices and interest rates on default and prepayment probabilities,
respectively, a sample of 1,428 residential loans was obtained from the portfolio
of a nationwide mortgage lending institution. The sample was constructed using
a probability sample of all loans ever encountering a 90-day delinquency and a
random sample of never delinquent (at 90 days) accounts.11 All sample loans were
originated between December, 1989 and June, 1991, with subsequent performance
information available through July, 1997. In sum, the dataset is characterized by
seasoning of approximately 5.5 to 7 years, and includes 889 loans that experienced
a9 0  day delinquency (default) and 539 never delinquent accounts.
In order to minimize the potential for model misspeciﬁcation and omitted-variable
bias, a variety of metrics were included to control for each individual borrower’s
willingness and ability to repay the mortgage obligation. Traditionally, measures
used by lenders to evaluate borrower creditworthiness include the loan-to-value
ratio, payment-to-income ratios and credit scores. The unique richness of the
current dataset allows for the explicit control of the LTV ratio, the borrower’s
total debt ratio (i.e., back-end ratio) and the borrower’s FICO credit score.
Furthermore, the data allow for the control of additional aspects of both borrower
heterogeneity and the terms of the credit agreement. A complete list of all the
variables used in the empirical investigation is included in Exhibit 1, with Exhibit
2 providing descriptive statistics for each attribute. Before proceeding to analyze
the data using multivariate Cox and logistic regression techniques, a brief
summary of this information is presented.
Option Characteristics
Looking ﬁrst at the volatility estimates, a high degree of variability surrounding
both of these option characteristics is observed. Speciﬁcally, the EGARCH
measure of housing price volatility (HPI  EGARCH) reveals that average
prices varied by over 2% per quarter, while analogous interest rate volatility94  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
Exhibit 1  Variable Deﬁnitions
INTEREST  EGARCH
This variable captures the conditional volatility of the ten-year constant maturity treasury rate. The spec-
iﬁcation for conditional variance that is estimated is:
22 log( )     log( )     /   ( / ). t1 t1 t1 t1 t1
Since the left hand side of the expression above is the log of the conditional variance, it implies that the
leverage effect is exponential. These forecasts of the conditional variance are guaranteed to be non-
negative. The hypothesis that   0 tests for the leverage effect.
HPI  EGARCH
This variable captures the conditional volatility of the current market value of the property, which is
estimated using the Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) state level weighted repeat
sales index to capture the change in single-family housing prices. The functional form of the equation
estimated is identical to that for INTEREST  EGARCH.
PNEQ
In order to capture the probability that a property has negative equity, PNEQ is given by:
log(outbal)  log(mbal)
PNEQ  	 ,  2 
where mbal is the current market value of the property estimated using the OFHEO state level weighted
repeat sales index to capture change in single-family house prices, outbal is the present value of all
remaining mortgage payments discounted at the contract interest rate,  is the standard error of the
OFHEO index number estimate and 	 is the cumulative standard normal distribution function.
PREPAY
In order to capture the extent to which the call option is in the money, PREPAY is given by:
pbal
PREPAY  1  ,
outbal
where pbal is the discounted value of the remaining mortgage payments at the current market rate and
outbal is the discounted value of the remaining mortgage payments at the contract interest rate (i.e., the
unpaid mortgage balance).
FICO
The borrower’s credit score calculated using Fair, Isaac and Co.’s proprietary scoring model. These
ﬁgures typically range from the low 300s into the mid-800s, with higher scores representing better credit
characteristics. The scores were generated at the lender’s request by one of the three principal credit
bureaus: Trans Union, Experian, or Equifax.
LTV
The loan-to-value ratio, based on the lesser of the sales price or appraised value, at the time of loan
origination.
ADDINC
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the lien contains two or more formally designated borrowers (i.e.,
at least one co-borrower is formally obligated to satisfy the loan) and the ﬁrst co-borrower has positive
gross income, zero otherwise.
TOTDEBT
A continuous variable equal to monthly principal, interest, taxes, and insurance (PITI) payments plus all
other monthly payment obligations relative to total (borrower and co-borrower) gross monthly income.Mortgage Terminations  95
JRER  Vol. 23  Nos. 1/2 – 2002
Exhibit 1  (continued)
Variable Deﬁnitions
LIQUID
A continuous variable equal to the ratio of the sum of the value of all savings, stocks, bonds, etc. held
by the borrower relative to total (borrower and co-borrower) gross annual income.
SELFEMP
A dichotomous variable equal to one if the borrower is self-employed, zero otherwise.
SELFLOC
A dichotomous variable equal to one if the borrower is self-employed and their primary work location
is within the residence, zero otherwise.
AMORT
A dichotomous variable equal to one if the amortization term of the loan is ﬁfteen years, zero otherwise.
ARM
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the mortgage is an adjustable-rate obligation, zero otherwise.
Note: within this dataset, all adjustable-rate mortgages are amortized over a thirty-year term.
BALLOON
A dichotomous variable equal to one if the mortgage is a balloon product, zero otherwise. Note: within
this dataset, all balloon mortgages are amortized on a 30-year basis
REFINANCE
A dichotomous variable equal to one if the loan is a non-cashout reﬁnancing (deﬁned as a loan for
which the value of the ratio of the loan amount to the outstanding lien is less than or equal to 1.06),
zero otherwise. Note: no purchase loans are cashout loans in this dataset.
CASHOUTL
A dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the loan is a cashout reﬁnancing where the value of the ratio of
the loan amount to the outstanding lien is greater than 1.06, but less than or equal to 1.50, zero
otherwise.
CASHOUTH
A dichotomous variable equal to one if the loan is a cashout reﬁnancing where the value of the ratio
of the loan amount to the outstanding lien is greater than 1.50, zero otherwise.
JUMBO
A dichotomous variable equal to one if the loan is a jumbo loan, zero otherwise.
ENTRYXXXX
A series of six dichotomous indicator variables identifying the chronological quarter in which each loan
was originated. Loans originated during December of 1989 represent the omitted (baseline) case and
are characterized by zeros for each indicator variable. All remaining loans assume the value of one for
the dichotomous variable corresponding to their quarter of origination and zero for the dichotomous
variables corresponding to all other quarters.
TIME
The number of months from loan origination to termination (i.e., prepayment or default).96  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
Exhibit 2  Variable Means and Standard Deviations
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Option Characteristics
INTEREST  EGARCH 0.20 0.02


























Note: n  1,428.
(INTEREST  EGARCH) averaged 20 basis points per month. Given the
importance of volatility as demonstrated by the empirical options literature, these
estimates suggest that volatility may play a signiﬁcant role in explaining mortgage
termination decisions.
Consistent with the view that default and prepayment are competing options, the
models incorporate two variables designed to measure the degree to which each
option is in-the-money. Following Deng, Quigley and Van Order (1996) and
Ambrose and Capone (1998, 2000), the probability that a mortgaged property
investment is in a negative equity situation (i.e., the probability that the option toMortgage Terminations  97
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default is in-the-money, or that the option to ‘‘put’’ the loan back to the lender is
proﬁtable) is estimated as:
log(outbal)  log(mbal)
PNEQ  	 , (8)  2 
where mbal is the current market value of the property estimated using the Ofﬁce
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) state level weighted repeat
sales index to capture changes in single-family house prices, outbal is the present
value of all remaining mortgage payments discounted at the contract interest rate,
 is the standard error of the OFHEO index number estimate and 	 is the
cumulative standard normal distribution function. The positive average value of
PNEQ in Exhibit 2 indicates that the default option is frequently in-the-money at
termination for the loans in this dataset. Ex ante, increases in the probability of
negative equity (PNEQ) are expected to be associated with enhanced default
probabilities.
Similarly, as modeled by Deng et al. and Ambrose and Capone, the prepayment
option is in-the-money when the discounted value of the remaining mortgage
payments at the current market rate is greater than the outstanding mortgage
balance. Thus, the degree to which the prepayment option is in-the-money may
be calculated as:
pbal
PREPAY  1  , (9)
outbal
where pbal is the discounted value of the remaining mortgage payments at the
current market rate, and outbal is the discounted value of the remaining mortgage
payments at the contract interest rate (i.e., the unpaid mortgage balance). Positive
values of PREPAY indicate that the market interest rate is higher than the contract
rate and prepayment option exercise is not proﬁtable (i.e., the option is out-of-
the-money). Conversely, negative values of PREPAY indicate that the market
interest rate is lower than the contract rate and option exercise is proﬁtable (i.e.,
the option is in-the-money). In Exhibit 2, the negative average value of PREPAY
indicates that the prepayment option is typically in-the-money at termination.
Borrower Heterogeneity
Deng, Quigley and Van Order (2000) advocate the options framework as a useful
tool for analyzing and explaining the behavior of mortgage termination options.98  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
However, they qualify this by stating ‘‘there exists signiﬁcant heterogeneity among
mortgage borrowers, particularly regarding prepayment.’’ They continue,
‘‘ignoring heterogeneity among mortgage borrowers leads to serious errors in
estimating the prepayment risk.’’
In order to control for borrower heterogeneity, the model speciﬁcation includes a
variety of borrower-speciﬁc risk characteristics. The average borrower in the
dataset is relatively creditworthy, as evidenced by a FICO credit score of nearly
700, a loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of only 74% and a total debt ratio (TOTDEBT)
of approximately 30%. These three metrics indicate that the average borrower in
this dataset easily surpasses traditional standards of creditworthiness on these
dimensions.12 In addition, co-borrower income (ADDINC) is available to satisfy
the mortgage in the event of short-term cash ﬂow interruptions for 39% of the
sample loans, while the typical mortgage within the dataset is secured by
liquidatable assets (LIQUID) equal to nearly one year’s gross income. Liquidatable
assets, like additional income, provide security to the lender in the event a
borrower encounters unexpected disturbances in short-term cash ﬂows. Limited
employment information was also made available to us, allowing us to control for
a borrower who is self-employed (SELFEMP), and whether a self-employed
borrower works inside or outside their primary residence (SELFLOC). Thirty-ﬁve
percent of the mortgage loans within this sample were made to self-employed
borrowers. However, less than 10% of the mortgage loans were made to self-
employed borrowers whose primary work location is within their residence.
Loan Characteristics
In order to further minimize model misspeciﬁcation, the models in this study also
control for differential loan attributes. Speciﬁcally, explicit controls are established
for jumbo loans. In addition, ﬁxed-rate, adjustable-rate and balloon mortgage
products are identiﬁed. Half of the loans in the dataset exceed secondary market
size guidelines for conforming loans, and are thus classiﬁed as JUMBO. This
relatively large fraction of non-conforming loans appears to be driven primarily
by the geographic distribution of properties within the dataset. While the sample
includes observations from forty states plus the District of Columbia, it is over-
represented by loans made in California (32%), New Jersey (18%) and New York
(17%). These three areas have all been characterized by traditionally high housing
prices and the prevalence of jumbo loans. With respect to ARM and balloon
products, approximately 9% of the sample is comprised of adjustable-rate (ARM)
mortgages, while 8% of the observations represent balloon loans (BALLOON).
Six percent of the loans are ﬁxed-rate obligations with a 15-year amortization
horizon (AMORT), while the remaining 77% constitute ﬁxed-rate obligations with
a 30-year amortization term. All ARM and balloon products within the dataset
are amortized on a 30-year basis.
The dataset also allows for the identiﬁcation and separation of home purchase and
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purchase loans, 30% of the observations come from reﬁnancings. In a reﬁnancing
situation, borrowers often obtain a new loan in an amount equal to the unpaid
mortgage balance on their existing obligation. Such a situation is referred to as a
‘‘non-cashout’’ reﬁnancing.13 Alternatively, many times borrowers reﬁnance to
extract cash from their equity position in the property and effectively re-lever the
investment. Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel and Hannan (1994) present empirical
evidence that ‘‘cashout’’ reﬁnancings are signiﬁcantly riskier than their ‘‘non-
cashout’’ counterparts. In order to control for the possibility of differential risk
across loan purposes, the model explicitly identiﬁes and controls for those loans
that are non-cashout reﬁnancings (REFINANCE), low cash-out reﬁnancings where
the new lien is less than or equal to 150% of the previous unpaid mortgage balance
(CASHOUTL) and high cash-out reﬁnancings where the new lien is greater than
150% of the previous unpaid mortgage balance (CASHOUTH). Ex ante, reﬁnance
loans are expected to exhibit higher default rates than home purchase loans, with
default hazard rates increasing concomitantly with the degree of cash extracted
via the reﬁnancing. Within the dataset, 7% of the loans are identiﬁed as ‘‘non-
cashout’’ reﬁnancings, 13% are identiﬁed as low ‘‘cashout’’ reﬁnancings and 10%
are identiﬁed as high ‘‘cashout’’ reﬁnancings.
Economic Conditions
In order to control for differential economic conditions at the time of loan
origination, a series of dummy variables identifying the year and quarter of loan
origination is included in the model speciﬁcation. As shown in Exhibit 2, sample
loan originations appear to be fairly evenly distributed across time. Speciﬁcally,
originations range from a low of 11% for the second quarter of 1991, to a high
of 22% for the ﬁrst quarter of 1990. Nine percent of the loans in the dataset were
originated in December, 1989 (captured by the omitted dummy variable).
 Analysis
In order to investigate the importance of conditional volatility to mortgage loan
performance, separate Cox regression models for the hazards of default and
prepayment were estimated. Exhibit 3 reports the results of the Cox default
regression, where defaults are deﬁned as loans that have ever been ninety or more
days delinquent.14 Within the Cox default framework, sample loans that either
prepaid in full during the period of study, or were still current as of July, 1997,
are treated as censored observations. Consistent with a priori expectations, and as
evidenced by the positive coefﬁcient on PNEQ (b  1.60), increasing the degree
to which the default option is in-the-money increases the probability of default.
The corresponding volatility input parameter (HPI  EGARCH), while exhibiting
the expected positive sign (b  0.03), is statistically insigniﬁcant. These results
are consistent with the view that PNEQ adequately captures the importance of
volatility on default option values. As noted, this result is arguably attributable to100  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
Exhibit 3  Cox Regression Model for the Timing of 90 Defaults
Variable Parameter Estimate Wald Chi-Square
Option Characteristics
INTEREST  EGARCH 9.31 8.9***


























Note: n  1,428. Model 
2 with 25 DF  196.9 (p  0.01).
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
the fact that PNEQ explicitly incorporates the standard error of the OFHEO index
into its calculation of option moneyness.
With respect to PREPAY, the positive coefﬁcient on PREPAY (b  20.67) indicates
that as prepayment becomes more proﬁtable, the competing risk of default
becomes less likely. As can be seen, not only is the option value variable
signiﬁcant, but so is the corresponding conditional volatility input parameter
(INTEREST  EGARCH). The negative coefﬁcient (b  9.31) for this variable
is consistent with increasing interest rate volatility enhancing prepayment optionMortgage Terminations  101
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value (over and above that captured by the variable PREPAY) and thus reducing
the probability of the competing hazard of default.
Additional model parameters designed to control for borrower speciﬁc risk factors
are generally consistent with expectations, as higher FICO scores are associated
with lower default rates (b  0.01), higher LTV ratios are associated with
increased default rates (b  3.60), the presence of positive co-borrower income
(ADDINC) reduces default probabilities (b  0.77), and self-employed
individuals working out of their primary residence (SELFLOC) are characterized
by higher default rates than other borrowers (b  0.86).
The empirical results from the Cox prepayment model are contained in Exhibit 4.
This speciﬁcation treats both loans that have experienced a 90-day delinquency
and loans that remain current as of the end of the sample period (July 1997) as
censored data. Examining the output, there is strong evidence that conditional
volatility inﬂuences mortgage termination decisions. With respect to the
conditional volatility input metrics, both interest rate and housing price volatility
appear signiﬁcantly related to the prepayment option exercise. Speciﬁcally, the
positive coefﬁcient on INTEREST  EGARCH (b  9.61) suggests that increasing
conditional interest rate volatility enhances the prepayment option value and thus
increases the probability of prepayment. Conversely, the negative coefﬁcient on
HPI  EGARCH (b  0.14) suggests that increasing the conditional volatility
of housing prices enhances default option value and thus lowers the probability
of the competing risk of prepayment. The negative (but insigniﬁcant) coefﬁcient
(b  0.44) on PNEQ is consistent with the notion that the prepayment option
exercise becomes less likely as the competing default option becomes more
valuable. Surprisingly, PREPAY is positive (b  5.21) and signiﬁcant, indicating
that the prepayment option exercise becomes less probable as the option moves
deeper into the money. The unexpected sign on PREPAY may be due, in part, to
multicollinearity between PREPAY and its corresponding conditional volatility
input parameter, INTEREST – EGARCH.15
The remaining model parameters in Exhibit 4 are generally consistent with a priori
expectations, as borrowers with high FICO scores, positive co-borrower income
(ADDINC) and those taking out JUMBO loans are more likely to prepay than
their less creditworthy, lower-income and non-JUMBO counterparts. Similarly,
borrowers with 15-year ﬁxed-rate loans are less likely to exercise the prepayment
option than their 30-year counterparts, while ARM loan prepayment rates are
signiﬁcantly lower than those observed for ﬁxed-rate instruments. These results
are not unexpected as option value should increase with time to maturity, and rate-
resetting provisions on ARMs mitigate the need to reﬁnance the lien in order to
capture the gains from lower market-wide interest rates. Finally, reﬁnancings
where borrowers extract a relatively high degree of equity (i.e., cash) from the
outstanding lien are also less likely to prepay than typical home purchase
obligations. High cashout reﬁnancings are often observed either because borrowers
are cash constrained and need to access all available sources of equity, or because
borrowers are consciously choosing to re-lever their investment in hopes of102  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
Exhibit 4  Cox Regression Model for the Timing of Prepayments
Variable Parameter Estimate Wald Chi-Square
Option Characteristics
INTEREST  EGARCH 9.61 25.3***


























Note: n  1,428. Model 
2 with 25 DF  548.3 (p  .01).
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
maximizing the value of their portfolios. Borrowers in both situations could
rationally be expected to exhibit lower prepayment propensities.
While the Cox regressions for the timing of both defaults and prepayments provide
valuable insight into the determinants of mortgage terminations, they do not
provide a truly competing risks framework for the analysis of such decisions. In
order to explicitly address this shortcoming of the previous analysis, the
investigation is extended to a truly competing risks framework where default and
prepayment are modeled as alternative mortgage outcomes.16Mortgage Terminations  103
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Conceptually, mortgage market outcomes may be thought of as a combination of
two separate and distinct stages. A borrower ﬁrst decides whether to terminate the
obligation and then, conditional on termination, chooses the type of termination
(i.e., default or prepayment) to pursue. In order to operationalize this process, a
generic Cox model of the time to mortgage termination is estimated. Stage one
treats both defaults and prepayments as a single termination event, with current
loans (as of July 1997) representing the censored data category. As one might
expect, given the competing risks nature of prepayment and default, this
(unreported) analysis of the timing of mortgage termination decisions is relatively
uninformative.
Stage two examines only those (1,335) loans that experienced a termination event.
A standard binary logistic model is then used to evaluate the determinants of the
type of mortgage termination event observed (i.e., default or prepayment). It is
important to note in this context that the probability of default is estimated relative
to prepayment, since current loans are excluded from the analysis. Exhibit 5
presents the results of this analysis and provides further evidence in support of
the importance of both the competing risks optionality framework and the role of
conditional volatility in mortgage termination decisions. Speciﬁcally, the positive
coefﬁcient on PNEQ (b  2.48) indicates that default probabilities rise as the
likelihood that a borrower is in a negative equity situation increases. Similarly,
the (insigniﬁcant) positive coefﬁcient on PREPAY (b  2.30) is consistent with
the notion that default becomes more likely as the competing option of prepayment
becomes less valuable. Turning to the conditional volatility input parameters, the
empirical evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that volatility enhances the
probability of the termination option exercise. For example, the positive coefﬁcient
on housing price volatility (b  0.23 for HPI  EGARCH) suggests that greater
variability in housing prices increases the value of the default option embedded
within the mortgage contract. Similarly, the (insigniﬁcant) negative coefﬁcient on
interest rate volatility (b  2.12) is consistent with the view that increased
interest rate volatility enhances prepayment option value, and thus reduces the
probability of default relative to prepayment.
Examining the remaining results for both borrower and loan characteristics
generally conﬁrms the importance of these attributes, as documented elsewhere in
the literature. For example, more creditworthy borrowers (as measured by higher
FICO scores) are less likely to default (b  0.02), while high LTV loans are
more likely to default (b  6.18). Similarly, the presence of positive co-borrower
income (ADDINC) reduces the relative likelihood of default (b  0.54), as do
reductions in a borrower’s total debt burden (b  1.78 for TOTDEBT). As
expected, self-employed borrowers, particularly those whose primary work
location is within their personal residence, are considerably more likely to default
than their externally employed counterparts (b  0.34 for SELFEMP, and b 
1.10 for SELFLOC).
Turning to loan characteristics, ARM loans (b  0.85) and reﬁnance loans (b 
0.84 for REFINANCE, b  1.12 for CASHOUTL, and b  1.24 for CASHOUTH)104  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
Exhibit 5  Logistic Model Comparing Defaults (i.e., ever 90 loans) and
Prepayments (relative to prepayments)
Variable Parameter Estimate Chi-Square
Option Characteristics
INTEREST  EGARCH 2.12 0.2


























Intercept and Time to Termination
INTERCEPT 9.15 16.3***
TIME 0.09 127.8***
Note: n  1,335. Model 
2 with 25 DF  228.4 (p  .01).
*Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
**Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.Mortgage Terminations  105
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are found to be somewhat more default prone than ﬁxed-rate and home purchase
loans, while JUMBO loans (b  0.41) are found to be somewhat less likely to
default. The positive coefﬁcient on BALLOON loans (b  0.30) and the negative
coefﬁcient on the 15-year amortization ﬂag (AMORT  0.33) are both consistent
with the results from the previously reported Cox default regression. However,
they now both fail to attain statistical signiﬁcance at conventionally accepted
levels. Finally, the negative coefﬁcient on the TIME variable (b  0.09) conﬁrms
that the longer a borrower continues to make timely payments of scheduled
principal and interest, the less likely the loan is to default. In sum, the results
conﬁrm the importance of traditional measures of borrower creditworthiness (e.g.,
FICO scores, LTV ratios, etc.) in mortgage termination decisions, provide further
evidence of the applicability of the competing risks framework to such events,
and reﬁne traditional measures of prepayment and default option values to account
for the role of conditional volatility.
 Marginal Effects
In order to obtain some economic intuition, a simulation is conducted to estimate
the marginal effects of selected independent variables on the probability of default.
Utilizing the parameter estimates obtained from the logistic model, the simulation
estimates the default probability for a typical borrower, and then calculates
changes in this probability associated with changes in individual risk
characteristics. The estimated marginal effects reported in Exhibit 6 provide
additional insight into the competing risks nature of default and prepayment
terminations.17
In the simulation, the base case borrower is assumed to have a 30-year ﬁxed-rate,
fully amortizing loan, a FICO score of 710, a LTV of 70%, a total debt ratio
(TOTDEBT) of 30%, and liquidatable assets (LIQUID) equivalent to one year’s
gross income. The origination date is assumed to be the ﬁrst quarter of 1990. The
remaining continuous variables in the model are set approximately at their mean
values (e.g., HPI  EGARCH is assigned the value 2.3), while the remaining
dichotomous variables are set equal to 0 (e.g., REFINANCE is assigned the value
0). Default rates for the continuous independent variables are calculated by
displacing each characteristic by the displayed amount (roughly one standard
deviation in either direction at the extremes). In the case of the dichotomous
variables, default probabilities are calculated for each variable based on the
presence or absence of the characteristic. Marginal effects are estimated as of the
origination date.
As reported in Exhibit 6, a reduction (increase) in housing price volatility
(HPI  EGARCH) of 1.2 percentage points (from 2.3% to 1.1%) produces over
a one-half percentage point reduction (increase) in the probability of default (from
6.58% to 5.96%). Changes in the other option characteristic, interest rate volatility
(INTEREST  EGARCH), produce less than one-tenth of a percentage point106  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
Exhibit 6  Simulated Marginal Effect of Selected Independent Variables on Default Probability
Variable
Estimated Default








































Note: Exhibit 6 simulates the change in default probability associated with changes in selected risk
characteristics. The baseline borrower is assumed to have a 30-year ﬁxed-rate loan, a total debt ratio
of 30%, a FICO score of 710, a 70% LTV, an origination date corresponding to the ﬁrst quarter of
1990 and liquidatable assets amounting to one year’s gross income. Marginal effects are simulated
as of the origination date. All remaining continuous variables are entered approximately at their
mean value, with all remaining dichotomous variables entered as zero.Mortgage Terminations  107
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change in the probability of default over the range of values analyzed. The latter
result is not surprising given the insigniﬁcance of the parameter estimate in the
logistic regression. Variability in a borrower’s credit score results in rather large
default probability swings. For example, lower credit scores produce a default
probability increase of over three percentage points (3.17%) for a 180 point
decrease in FICO (from 710 to 530). The simulation also quantiﬁes the riskier
nature of ARM loans relative to fully amortizing, 30-year, ﬁxed-rate obligations,
since the estimated default rate is approximately one and one-half percentage
points higher for adjustable-rate securities. Changes in the origination LTV of ten
percentage points in either direction result in default rate changes of between one
and one and one-half percentage points. Finally, the marginal effects simulation
also shows that changes in the probability of negative equity (PNEQ) and the
value of the prepayment option (PREPAY) produce approximately one-half
percentage point changes in default probabilities over the range of values analyzed.
These simulation results clearly show that the conditional volatility of housing
prices exerts an economically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the mortgage default
decision.
 Conclusion
The recent literature on mortgage terminations has incorporated options theory
into the analysis of default and prepayment decisions by modeling these
alternatives as competing risks. Within the competing risks framework, measures
have been created to capture the relative moneyness of these embedded put and
call options. Despite their usefulness, traditional measures of default and
prepayment option moneyness (PNEQ and PREPAY) do not adequately account
for the role and importance of conditional volatility as suggested in the options
literature. Speciﬁcally, the probability of negative equity (PNEQ) incorporates a
conditional (time-varying) volatility metric, but does not address the fact that the
volatility of housing prices changes more rapidly when there are decreases in
market values than when there are increases (i.e., the leverage effect). The
traditional measure of the extent to which the call option is in the money
(PREPAY) fails to incorporate any volatility parameter. The construction of these
variables fails to fully account for the ﬁndings of the options literature, which
suggest that conditional volatility provides a more accurate input into the pricing
of options. The goal of this study has been to bridge the gap between the
conceptualization of volatility in the empirical options literature and its
implementation within the competing risks mortgage terminations literature.
The driving intuition behind this study draws on research into the distribution
characteristics of securities. This research reveals that conditional volatility is a
critical feature of both equity and debt security return patterns. Taking this as a
starting point, this study estimates the conditional volatility of the underlyings for
the two competing options: housing prices and interest rates. In order to estimate
the conditional volatility of the underlyings, an exponential GARCH speciﬁcation108  Harrison, Noordewier and Ramagopal
is employed. This speciﬁcation captures the leverage effect that is an important
feature of the conditional volatility of the returns of securities.
In the context of a Cox default model, the signs on both the conditional volatility
inputs conform to expectations, with the conditional interest volatility coefﬁcient
being highly signiﬁcant. In the Cox prepayment model, both of the conditional
volatility inputs are highly signiﬁcant, and exhibit the expected signs. Finally, in
the competing risks logistic model, the HPI conditional volatility input displays
both the correct sign and is signiﬁcant.
A few points in the study are worth highlighting. First, accepting that the
competing options framework is a useful paradigm, this study extends the
literature by providing a reﬁned input into the empirical operationalization of
embedded mortgage options valuation. Additional reﬁnements may further
enhance the accuracy with which these embedded options are priced. Second, the
results of the investigation may be useful in explaining regional disparities and
international differences in mortgage termination behavior. For example, if interest
rate or housing price volatility varies across geographic boundaries, the relative
propensity of borrowers to default or prepay might likewise vary. Finally, from
the perspective of secondary market purchasers of mortgage instruments, the
ability to more accurately evaluate and gauge prepayment and default probabilities
may well lead to an enhanced ability to manage risk.
 Endnotes
1 Avery, Bostic, Calem and Canner (1996) argue that borrowers may not exercise the
default option ruthlessly, but rather suggest that defaults are most likely only when a
negative equity situation is accompanied by a ‘‘triggering event’’ such as loss of
employment, decline in income, divorce, etc.
2 While borrowers do capture the entire explicit increase in property values, lenders do
beneﬁt from such price appreciation in the form of co-insurance on the debt.
3 The construction of PNEQ and PREPAY is detailed below. In more recent work, Deng,
Quigley and Van Order (2000) label these metrics Put Option and Call Option,
respectively.
4 Consistent with Capozza, Kazarian and Thompson (1998), the term ‘‘unconditional’’ is
employed when the volatility is conditioned exclusively on the information set available
at origination. Conversely, the term ‘‘conditional’’ is used when volatility is conditioned
on information available subsequent to origination.
5 A powerful hybrid of the binomial pricing method is the model of Hilliard, Kau and
Slawson (1996), who use a bivariate binomial lattice to price the competing options
embedded in mortgage contracts. Their study uses a simulations methodology to price
options. In this setting, the underlying stochastic process deﬁnes volatility.
6 The Vega of the default (prepayment) option is the change in the price of the option
relative to the change in the volatility of housing prices (interest rates).
7 See Kim and Kim (1994). Two additional critical features are skewness and kurtosis.
8 Conditional volatility estimates for interest rates are derived in an analogous fashion.Mortgage Terminations  109
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9 The data are ﬁrst-differenced to ensure stationarity.
10 In order to ensure stationarity, the restriction on the parameters in the GARCH (1,1) is
1  1  1.
11 In order to accommodate the probability sampling design employed, all analyses
reported below were conducted using the software program SUDAAN, which offers
Taylor series linearization to produce correct standard errors.
12 Traditional lender cut-offs for acceptable borrower credit risk include an LTV of 80%
for non-insured loans, a total debt ratio of 31%–33%, and a FICO score of approximately
620.
13 Closing costs and ﬁnancing charges associated with reﬁnancing the loan are also
frequently rolled into the new mortgage. The underwriting lender for all the loans in
the dataset deﬁned non-cashout reﬁnance loans as loans for which the value of the ratio
of the loan amount to the outstanding lien is less than or equal to 1.06.
14 Multiple ‘‘default’’ deﬁnitions are possible and have been employed throughout the
literature. Consistent with the general consensus of both industry practitioners and the
academic community (Ambrose and Capone 1998, 2000), delinquency is viewed as
superior to foreclosure as a default metric, since delinquency status is not subject to the
differential application of loss mitigation strategies across borrower characteristics or
property attributes. Similarly, foreclosure as a measure of default is potentially
troublesome due to differential bankruptcy provisions and other jurisdictional variances
across geographic regions. For a further discussion of the appropriate deﬁnition of bad
loans, see Avery, Bostic, Calem and Canner (1996) or Jaske (1997).
15 The correlation between PREPAY and INTEREST  EGARCH is 0.21. Estimating the
prepayment model and excluding the call option variable PREPAY produces a coefﬁcient
estimate that is consistent in sign and stronger in both magnitude and signiﬁcance for
the corresponding conditional volatility input parameter INTEREST  EGARCH. The
conditional volatility of interest rates in the prepayment decision appears robust to the
inclusion or exclusion of the PREPAY optionality parameter.
16 Theoretically, the multinomial logit framework is one approach that could be used for
estimation purposes, since the dataset includes loans with three distinct, mutually
exclusive and exhaustive outcomes (i.e., 889 defaults, 446 prepayments and 93 current
loans). However, the distribution of mortgage outcomes across these three classiﬁcations
leads to convergence and singularity problems when applying the framework to the data,
as less than 7% of the sample loans remained current as of July 1997. Therefore, this
study employs a two-stage approach to modeling mortgage termination decisions. For a
complete discussion of appropriate operationalizations of competing risks models, see
Allison (1995).
17 A potential limitation of the two-stage approach employed in the study, rather than a
multinomial logit approach, is that the binary logistic speciﬁcation involves only defaults
versus prepayments. To the extent that current goods are disproportionately more likely
to prepay (default) rather than default (prepay) our estimated default probabilities could
be overstated (understated) relative to the population of all loan originations.
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